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Equality Law Obligations in Higher Education: reasonable adjustments under the 
Equality Act 2010 in assessment of students with unseen disabilities 
ABSTRACT 
8% of UK students have an ‘unseen disability’: a specific learning difficulty, autistic 
spectrum condition, or mental ill health. A department with 1000 students has, on average, 80 
students with such unseen disabilities. These students have a variety of potential sources of 
legal redress if they consider a university has failed properly to accommodate their disability. 
The most plausible is a claim under the Equality Act 2010. We have experienced a lack of 
clarity in understanding the nature and extent of those Equality Act entitlements, and the 
corresponding obligations that fall upon universities, and their staff. These confusions occur 
in many contexts, but the one that is most important to students is their entitlements where 
assessments are concerned. We set out to explain the relevant law, and to consider how it 
applies to some, perhaps typical, unseen disabilities in the context of a range of approaches 
taken by universities in assessing their students. Our principal and important conclusion is 
that there is no ‘quick fix’ approach according to which someone may say that they are 
Equality Act compliant. However, there are several considerations which will increase (or 
decrease) the likelihood of compliance. In brief, these constitute effective communication; 
procedures that secure individual decisions, rather than blanket policies or approaches; and 
what amounts to no more than good inclusive educational practice for all students. 
Key words: Education law; discrimination law; legal education 
INTRODUCTION 
Let us imagine Dr James, an ordinary academic member of staff, in an ordinary department, 
in an ordinary UK university in the 21st century. Let’s be sufficiently generous to that group 
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of people and also imagine that she is sympathetic to equality agendas.1 One of the dozens of 
emails she receives each day reads something like this: 
Aidan has provided the Disability Support Unit with evidence that he has a Specific 
Learning Difficulty. Aidan’s Specific Learning Difficulty means he has difficulty 
with visual processing and in the production of accurate written work. His reading 
comprehension speed is slow.  Aidan is likely to benefit from copies of PowerPoint 
slides and lecture notes being made available in advance (if not already available on 
the VLE); reading lists which distinguish between core and secondary reading and 
clearly state if students are required to read a text in its entirety; coursework hand-in 
dates being spread out; academic staff taking into account the potential for his 
Specific Learning Difficulty to have an impact on his studies when considering the 
form and content of assessments. Aidan will be permitted 25% extra time in all formal 
examinations. 
What is Dr James supposed to do about this email? 
Of course, the answer is context-dependent. If Aidan’s course is one which involves research 
and analysis of data presented visually; or where written accuracy is important; or significant 
amounts of reading, including skimming, scanning are required; or where independent 
research is expected before a lecture takes place; or where ability to complete tasks in a tight 
timeframe is essential; or a host of other things that are recognisable and undisputed qualities 
of graduates, according to QAA benchmarks, then Dr James, however sympathetic she may 
                                               
1 An admittedly small scale study, reported here, suggests that the majority of academics are indeed so 
supportive: L Kendall, ‘Supporting students with disabilities within a UK university: lecturer perspectives’ 
Innovations in Education and Teaching International (2017) http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14703297.2017.1299630; 
as does the larger scale study reported by M Smith, ‘Participants’ attitudes to inclusive teaching practice at a UK 
university: Will staff “resistance” hinder implementation?’ (2010) 16 Tertiary Education and Management 211. 
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be to equality agendas, may baulk a little at the implication of the email that Aidan be treated 
differently to others in his cohort through the adjustments she is implicitly being asked to 
make. All graduates in my discipline, she might think, need to demonstrate these skills. What 
if my friend in industry or a profession relies on my assessment in deciding whether to give 
one of our graduates a job? It is not reasonable, therefore, she might feel, to expect Aidan to 
be treated any differently from anyone else.2 
On the other hand, if the courses on which Dr James teaches do not need to assess ability to 
engage with written materials, and complete successive assessments, within a particular 
timeframe, Dr James might feel that it would be reasonable to ensure that neither Aidan nor 
indeed anyone else on the course is inadvertently expected to do so. Timeframes within 
which such assessments must be completed are there for practical and administrative reasons; 
Dr James and her colleagues need to complete the marking and processes the marks in time 
for departmental examination boards to consider them. There is no need to make assessment 
timeframes tighter than those practical considerations require, especially if someone like 
Aidan were to be disadvantaged by so doing. Or, to the extent that the course assessments 
involve processing of written material, Dr James may understand that 25% extra time in 
assessments is a reasonable way to make sure that Aidan’s abilities and competencies in the 
subject matter of the course, as opposed to his reading abilities, are what is being tested. 
There might be some things about which Dr James is unsure what would be reasonable. For 
instance, Dr James may be sure that her course is not testing the ability of students to follow 
lectures without being able to see and reflect on the associated PowerPoint slides before each 
lecture. If that is so, is it reasonable to expect her to adjust her normal practice, and ensure 
                                               
2 Similar concerns are reported on in Smith, above n 1. 
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that her PowerPoints are available in advance of each lecture?  And if it is, must that be four 
days before each lecture, or would 24 hours do?   
OUR RESEARCH AGENDA 
The tensions between the approach of the imagined university’s Disability Support Unit, the 
expectations of Aidan and Dr James, and the legal obligations of their university, particularly 
under the Equality Act 2010, encapsulate the primary motivation behind the project on which 
we report in this article. We believe that the legal position is currently misunderstood by 
university staff and students alike.3 In reaching this view, we are drawing on our experiences 
working in Higher Education institutions: in the case of Cameron, 17 years working in 
Higher Education, 12 of which researching and teaching specific learning difficulties, in an 
English language teaching unit and academic department in one pre-92 and one post-92 
university in the North of England; Coleman’s 22 years at every level of the disabled students 
support sector in England, including 6 years as the Head of a Disability and Dyslexia Support 
Service in a pre-92 university; and Hervey’s 27 years as a member of academic staff and 
external examiner with a research agenda in equality law in pre-92 and post-92 universities in 
the North and Midlands of England.4 We are also drawing on the results of a small pilot 
                                               
 
4 Although the government has gone some way to redressing this (see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/587221/Inclusive_Teaching_and
_Learning_in_Higher_Education_as_a_route_to-excellence.pdf), this lack of understanding is compounded by 
the available literature. For instance, some discussions of adjustments under the EqA in this context (such as O 
Konur, ‘Teaching Disabled Students in Higher Education’ 11 Teaching in Higher Education (2006) 351-363; 
Smith above n 1) although discussing general concerns about implications of EqA compliance for academic 
standards, fail to even mention “competence standards” (see below), a key element of the EqA obligations. 
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study, undertaken by Rahman in summer 2016.5 The pilot involved 18 semi-structured 
interviews with people within a Northern pre-92 (Russell Group) university who either have 
insights as someone with particular professional expertise or who self identify as a disabled 
person, with mental ill-health, autism spectrum conditions, and/or specific learning 
difficulties, or both. Participants were approached by email or word of mouth, using a 
snowballing effect, beginning from Cameron’s and Coleman’s networks. The data was 
anonymised and analysed to create fictional scenarios, which encapsulated the key themes 
arising from the experiences of those interviewed.6 Our impression, confirmed in the 
literature,7 is that the misunderstandings that pervade universities concerning the legal 
position of students with these kinds of disabilities may be leading to pressures and emotive 
responses. Consequently, the ensuing policies and practice lack rigour. .  
We should begin by being explicit about our positions and therefore the assumptions which 
inform our research agenda. All of us are positive about equality in higher education. We 
each have expertise in the field of equal treatment of people with disabilities: Cameron as 
Senior Lecturer in Education with a specialism in SpLDs and ASCs, and former Academic 
Director of a specialist specific learning difficulties tutorial service; Hervey as a Professor of 
                                               
5 This project was cleared by the University of Sheffield Research Ethics Process, Application 009619, June 
2016. We are grateful for the support of the University of Sheffield’s SURE programme: 
https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/sure.  
6 The fictional scenarios were the basis of Rahman’s final year UG dissertation, entitled ‘Does the Equality Act 
2010 and the UK legal system sufficiently accommodate the needs of students with unseen disabilities in higher 
education?’. We draw on Rahman’s scenarios indirectly to inform our analysis in this article.  
7 Kendall, above n 1, found academic staff ‘feeling overwhelmed, under pressure and fearful of being accused of 
discrimination’ and that ‘the issue of reasonable adjustments was an emotive area for the participants [academic 
staff in a northern English university], associated with doubt and fear regarding what they needed to do and how 
they could do it.’, at p 9. See also S Riddell and E Weedon, ‘Disabled students in higher education: discourses 
of disability and the negotiation of identity’ 63 International Journal of Educational Research (2014) 38-46. 
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Law with expertise in equality law; Rahman as a student intern on the project; Rostant as an 
Employment Judge; and Coleman as Head of a Disability Support Service. We set out to 
understand and explain the Equality Act 2010’s obligations on reasonable adjustments for 
students with what are known as ‘unseen disabilities’, and the implications for university 
policy and practice, and thus for student experience. In so doing, we consider some broader 
legal and theoretical contexts, in particular the legal relationships between students and 
universities,8 and understandings of disability in contemporary UK society, including the 
narratives of human rights activism. 
By ‘unseen disabilities’, we mean mental health conditions, autism spectrum disorders, 
certain long term physical illnesses, and specific learning difficulties (SpLDs, including 
dyslexia, ADHD, dyspraxia)). This project focuses on assessments, as the area of academic 
life of perhaps the utmost concern to students. The effects of university assessments on 
people with unseen disabilities are difficult to measure, experienced differently by different 
individuals, and are therefore easily open to dispute. 
 
STUDENTS WITH ‘UNSEEN DISABILITIES’ 
As higher education in the UK metamorphoses through the current era of rising student fees, 
global marketisation, and ever more attention to metricised ‘success’ in both teaching and 
                                               
8 For a detailed discussion, see N Harris, ‘Students, Mental Health and Citizenship’ 24 Legal Studies (2004) 
349-385. 
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research,9 it is accompanied by subtle and not-so-subtle shifts in the make-up of the student 
body, and the proportion of the student body comprising disabled students.10  
While there was a small rise in overall first-year student numbers between 2013 and 2016, 
there was a notably larger rise in the numbers of disabled students, both in absolute terms and 
as a proportion of the total.11  Of the body of disabled students (enrolled in the first year of 
their course), those diagnosed with specific learning difficulties (SpLDs, including dyslexia, 
ADHD, dyspraxia) continue to make up the largest percentage (just under 50% of disabled 
students and about 5% of the entire student body). Over the past three academic years, the 
proportion of the disabled student body made up by students with SpLDs has dropped 
slightly, whilst the proportion of students diagnosed with mental health conditions and with 
autism spectrum conditions (ASCs) has grown. This pattern may be connected to the broader 
public familiarity with and acceptance of ASCs and mental health conditions; that is, there 
has been a period of catch-up for these two populations in comparison to public familiarity 
with SpLDs like dyslexia. It may also be connected to the shifting criteria for particular 
diagnoses governed by the American Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
                                               
9 See, eg S Collini, What are Universities For? (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2012); L Back, Academic Diary 
(London: Goldsmiths Press, 2016); S Collini, Speaking of Universities (Verso, 2017); F Furedi, What’s 
Happened to the University? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017). 
10 While in employment contexts, the preferred term is ‘person with a disability’, certainly in the UK, in the 
context of Higher Education, ‘disabled students’ is preferred. 
11 See the HESA data available from https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-
analysis/students/overviews?keyword=All&breakdown%5B%5D=581&year=620 (last visited 14 December 
2017). HEFCE data from 2013/14 shows that 10% of all students in the UK have disclosed a disability, although 
in many HE providers these disclosure rates sometimes are close to 20%. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/587221/Inclusive_Teaching_and
_Learning_in_Higher_Education_as_a_route_to-excellence.pdf (last visited 14 December 2017). 
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Disorders.12 Overall, in 2015/16, students labelled with SpLDs, ASCs, or mental health 
conditions made up 65% of disabled students and just under 8% of the whole student body 
(up on just under 7% in 2013/14), although fewer students appear to be applying for Disabled 
Students’ Allowances (DSA) than these figures suggest.13  
On average, then, for each group of 50 students, there will be at least 4 students who 
experience SpLDs, ASCs, or mental health conditions. A university department with 1000 
students has, on average, 80 students who have declared unseen disabilities, and probably 
more if we add in students with certain invisible long-term physical conditions such as 
epilepsy or Crohn’s Disease. There may also be students who experience characteristics of 
SpLDs, ASCs or mental health conditions, but whose conditions are either undiagnosed or 
undeclared.14 This is not a small issue. 
Students with SpLDs, ASCs, and mental health conditions can experience certain shared 
challenges to educational participation; including difficulties with organisation of study and 
                                               
12 American Psychiatric Association (APA), Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 5th ed. 
(Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013).  
13 See Table C - Percentage of UK domiciled students in receipt of Disabled Students’ Allowance by location of 
HE provider and academic year 2000/01 - 2016/17: https://www.hesa.ac.uk/news/01-02-2018/widening-
participation-summary which shows 6.6% of full time first degree students in receipt of DSA 16/17, compared 
to 1.5% in 2000/01. 
14 For a discussion of the complexities in over and under-representation of women and girls, and particular 
ethnic groups in particular subcategories of Special Educational Need, see, e.g., G Lindsay, S Pather, and S 
Starand, Special Educational Needs and Ethnicity: Issues of Over- and Under-Representation Research Report 
No. 757 (2006) Department for Education and Skills, Centre for Educational Development, Appraisal and 
Research Institute of Education, University of Warwick ISBN 1 84478 746 X available at: 
https://www.naldic.org.uk/Resources/NALDIC/Research%20and%20Information/Documents/RR757.pdf.  
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of life,15 difficulties in developing effective learning or participation strategies in the higher 
education context,16 difficulties with some forms of assessment,17 difficulties meeting 
expectations of written or spoken English, which impacts upon essay writing skills, or 
participation in seminars and other spaces where spoken participation is expected,18 
difficulties with particular aspects of cognition, such as working memory,19 experience of 
high levels of stress and anxiety and/or lack of confidence in certain environments,20 and 
                                               
15 T Mortimore and W R Crozier, ‘Dyslexia and Difficulties with Study Skills in Higher Education’ (2006) 31 
Studies in Higher Education 235; V Hees, T Moyson and H Roeyers, ‘Higher education experiences of students 
with autism spectrum disorder: challenges, benefits and support needs’ (2015) 45 Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders 1673. 
16 D Jansen, K Petry, E Ceulemans, S van der Oord, I Noens and D Baeyens, ‘Functioning and participation 
problems of students with ASD in higher education: which reasonable accommodations are effective?’, (2017) 
32 European Journal of Special Needs Education 71; E Murphy, ‘Responding to the needs of students with 
mental health difficulties in higher education: an Irish perspective, (2017) 32 European Journal of Special 
Needs Education 110; M Madriaga and D Goodley, ‘Moving beyond the minimum: Socially just pedagogies 
and Asperger syndrome in UK higher education’ (2009) 14 International Journal of Inclusive Education 115; L 
Hartrey, S Denieffe, J S G Wells, ‘A systematic review of barriers and supports to the participation of students 
with mental health difficulties in higher education’ (2017) 6 Mental Health and Prevention 26;  Mortimore and 
Crozier, above n 15. 
17 D Jansen, K Petry, E Ceulemans, S van der Oord, I Noens and D Baeyens, ‘Functioning and participation 
problems of students with ADHD in higher education: which reasonable accommodations are effective?’ (2017) 
32 European Journal of Special Needs Education 35-53. 
18 H E Cameron, ‘Beyond cognitive deficit: the everyday lived experience of dyslexic students at university’, 
(2016) 31 Disability & Society 322-329; C Collinson and C Penketh. ‘ “Sit in the Corner and Don’t Eat All the 
Crayons”, Postgraduates with Dyslexia and the Dominant ‘Lexic’ Discourse’ (2010) 25 Disability & Society 7. 
19 R I Nicolson and A J Fawcett. Dyslexia, Learning, and the Brain (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 2008). 
20  F Knott and A Taylor, ‘Life at university with Asperger syndrome: a comparison of student and staff 
perspectives’, (2014) 18 International Journal of Inclusive Education 411; M Madriaga, ‘Enduring Disablism: 
Students with Dyslexia and Their Pathways into UK Higher Education and beyond’ (2007) 22 Disability & 
Society 399; J M Carroll and J E Iles, ‘An Assessment of Anxiety Levels in Dyslexic Students in Higher 
Education’ (2006) 76 British Journal of Educational Psychology 651; T Glennon, ‘The stress of the university 
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concerns about what the label means and how it will be viewed by peers and tutors.21 
Students with these ‘unseen disabilities’ may experience one, two, or more of these 
difficulties, as well as difficulties specific to their ‘condition’. They may also experience 
difficulties inconsistently. It is common for students to experience certain environments as 
particularly disabling, and others as less so,22 and it is also expected that students’ experience 
of disability may fluctuate for a number of different reasons. The accuracy of diagnoses of 
dyslexia, for sub-types of ASCs, and for some mental health conditions have been put into 
                                                                                                                                                  
experience for students with Asperger syndrome’ (2001) 17 Work: A Journal of Prevention, Assessment and 
Rehabilitation 183. 
21 H Cameron and T Billington, ‘ “Just Deal with It”: Neoliberalism in Dyslexic Students’ Talk about Dyslexia 
and Learning at University’ (2017) 42 Studies in Higher Education 1358; H Cameron and T Billington, ‘The 
Discursive Construction of Dyslexia by Students in Higher Education as a Moral and Intellectual Good’ (2015) 
30 Disability & Society 1225. 
22 The concept that the location of disability is the environment, and not the person, is well-known in disability 
studies. It has entered into the law through the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(adopted 13 December 2006, entry into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3, which adopts a ‘social model’ of 
disability. The ‘social model’ points to the interaction between impairment and barriers erected by society which 
create the disability. For instance, a person with a mobility impairment is disabled by some aspect of society 
(say, the built environment) which makes it difficult or impossible to mobilise without the ability to walk. An 
early use of the term ‘social model’ is found in P Hunt, Stigma: The Experience of Disability, (London, 
Geoffrey Chapman, 1966). For further discussion, see G Quinn, M. McDonagh and C Kimber, (eds), Disability 
Discrimination Law in the US, Australia and Canada (Dublin: Oak Tree Press 1993); M Oliver, Understanding 
Disability: From Theory to Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 1996 and 2009); M A Stein, ‘Disability 
Human Rights’ (2007) 95 California Law Review 75; J L Roberts, ‘Healthism and the Law of Employment 
Discrimination’ (2014) 99 Iowa Law Review 571, pp 584-587; I Solanke, ‘Stigma: A limiting principle allowing 
multiple-consciousness in anti-discrimination law’ in D Schiek and V Chege, (eds), European Union Non-
Discrimination Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009); C Heißl and G Boot, ‘The application of the EU Framework 
for Disability Discrimination in 18 European countries’ (2013) 4 European Labour Law Journal 119; L 
Waddington, ‘ “Not disabled enough”: How European Courts filter non-discrimination claims through a narrow 
view of disability’ (2015) European Journal of Human Rights 11; C O’Brien, Union citizenship and disability: 
restricted access to equality rights and the attitudinal model of disability’ in D Kochenov, ed, Citizenship and 
Federalism in Europe: The Role of Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2016). 
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question by various academics in related fields.23 Moreover, although the use of certain labels 
is changing, SpLDs, ASCs and mental health conditions are often described as varying in 
degree and type. It is possible for a student to receive a diagnosis of ‘borderline’, ‘mild’ or 
‘severe’ dyslexia; to experience ‘mild’ depression, and to be diagnosed as on a particular 
point on the autistic ‘spectrum’. Here, the ‘spectrum’ should not be understood as linear, but 
multi-dimensional, and context-bound.24  In practice, this means that two individuals who 
have been given the same broad diagnosis may experience very different educational 
challenges which differ in type, degree of difficulty, and which may depend upon the 
environmental barriers present in a particular context.25 These differences have implications 
for legal redress. Identical diagnoses would not necessarily lead to the same outcome in 
litigation. When it comes to what duties apply under the Equality Act, what may be 
‘reasonable’ for one student given a particular diagnosis may not be so for another given the 
same diagnosis. Our analysis below, having explained why other types of legal claims are 
likely to be less useful, charts a course through the complex obligations of the Equality Act, 
taking account of duties to the disabled student, as well as the position of universities and the 
staff who work within them, and the wider student body.  
                                               
23 For SpLDs, see, for example, J G Elliott and E Grigorenko, ‘The end of dyslexia?’ (2014) 27 The 
Psychologist 576; for autism spectrum conditions, see, for example, E Schopler, ‘Are autism and Asperger 
syndrome (AS) different labels or different disabilities?’ (1996) 26 Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders 109; and for mental health conditions, see, for example, A V Horwitz and J C  Wakefield, The loss of 
sadness: how psychiatry transformed normal sorrow into depressive disorder (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
24 See L Beardon, Autism and Asperger Syndrome in Adults (Sheldon Press, 2017). 
25 For example, a recent review of the literature on students with ADHD concluded that effective support for 
such students takes into account characteristics of the individual student, and not only of the environment, see 
Jansen, et al above n 11. 
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Evidence suggests that it is likely that current provision of reasonable adjustments for 
students with unseen disabilities is inconsistent. Other than a fairly uniform provision of 25% 
extra time in exams for many students with unseen disabilities, different universities 
approach the provision of reasonable adjustments differently, and there are also differences 
between and within departments within the same university.26 For instance, some universities 
or departments employ a sticker-system to highlight assessed work submitted by disabled 
students, and others do not.  
Universities also differ in the model for support worker services they adopt: some universities 
have in-house support worker services, whilst others outsource this support to agencies; some 
offer financial support for diagnostic assessment, others do not.  
Some universities are more willing to ‘underwrite’ support for students who are in the 
process of applying for Disabled Students’ Allowances (DSA), while others will wait until 
they receive the DSA Needs Assessment report (which can take up to 14 weeks)27 before 
putting support in place. Recent cuts and other changes to DSA28 have also increased the 
                                               
26 For examples, see H Cameron and K Nunkoosing, ‘Lecturer perspectives on dyslexia and dyslexic students 
within one faculty at one university in England’ (2012) 17 Teaching in Higher Education 341-352; Murphy, 
above n 16; Kendall, above n 1; W Hall, ‘Supporting students with disabilities in higher education, in A 
Campbell and L. Norton (eds), Learning, teaching and assessing in higher education: Developing reflective 
practice (Exeter: Learning Matters, 2007), pp 130-139. 
27 https://dsa-qag.org.uk/students/faqs (last visited 14 December 2017). 
28 Disabled Students’ Allowances: Written statement - HCWS347, 2 December 2015 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-
statement/Commons/2015-12-02/HCWS347/ (last visited 14 December 2017); Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills, Government Response: Consultation on Targeting Funding for Disabled Students in 
Higher Education from 2016/17 onwards, December 2015 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/481399/bis-15-657-targeting-
funding-for-disabled_students-in-higher-education-government-response.pdf (last visited 14 December 2017). 
For discussion of the effects of funding reductions, see Riddell and Weedon, above n 7. 
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inconsistency of provision for disabled students across the sector. For instance, DSA is no 
longer available to fund ‘non-specialist’ support workers such as note-takers or personal 
assistants – leading to some universities arranging alternative provision while others continue 
to fund such support. Overall, the changes to DSA have increased the onus on universities to 
ensure equal access for disabled students.29  
All of these changes raise the question of whether greater care is needed when considering 
the adjustments required during exams and other university assessments in order for 
universities to fulfil their legal obligations. And – along with the overall changes to higher 
education, including increased ‘marketisation’, conceptualising the relationship between 
university and student as an ‘investment’, an increasing language of ‘service’ culture – all of 
these changes affect the likelihood of litigation30 to enforce legal entitlements. 
No university wants to enter into litigation, particularly not litigation involving its own 
students. Every university needs to balance litigation risk against other matters, including 
reputational damage.31 Decisions about equality policies and practices are made not only on 
legal grounds. They also express the moral duties universities understand themselves as 
                                               
29 The changes to DSA are explicitly recognised as a driver for improvements in the approach to the duty to 
make reasonable adjustments by the Department of Education in its guidance document “inclusive Teaching and 
Learning in Higher Education as a route to Excellence” (Disabled Students Leadership Group, DoE, January 
2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/587221/Inclusive_Teaching_and
_Learning_in_Higher_Education_as_a_route_to-excellence.pdf (last visited 14 December 2017). 
30 There is some evidence, albeit anecdotal at present, of a growing willingness by students to litigate against 
universities. See for example https://www.buzzfeed.com/rosebuchanan/heres-why-more-and-more-students-are-
suing-their?utm_term=.wcQ721NVP#.htlGmvN0b and 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/2017/08/07/students-sue-oxford-discrimination-amid-surge-mental-
health/ (both last visited 14 December 2017). 
31 For further discussion of managing litigation risk by universities see Harris, above n 8. 
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holding towards their student bodies,32 as well as being driven by external factors such as 
government policy and the requirements of professional bodies.  
But the law matters. In offering this analysis, we are seeking to enhance understanding of the 
legal position of students with unseen disabilities when it comes to their assessments. Our 
analysis is aimed at university senior management teams and their advisors, ordinary 
academic staff, and students. At the moment, we think lack of rigour in approach (and even 
downright muddle) currently pervades both understanding and practice.  
 
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION: THE LEGAL 
POSITION 
What then is the source of legal redress for a student with an unseen disability who considers 
that her or his university has failed to take into account the disability in designing or 
administering assessments? There are four possible causes of action: a claim under s 7 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998; a claim in contract; a negligence claim; or a claim under the 
Equality Act.  In fact, as far as we have been able to determine, there has so far been almost 
no litigation of any type concerning unseen disabilities and university assessments.  That is 
probably because students who seek to resolve a dispute that has not been resolved by the 
university’s internal complaints processes tend to use the Office of the Independent 
Adjudicator (OIA). 
The OIA is the ombudsman service for university students in the UK.  It reviews student 
complaints against individual higher education providers. The recommendations of the OIA 
                                               
32 See Smith, above n 1. 
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are not legally enforceable, although they carry a moral authority and the risk of reputational 
damage if ignored. Part 2 of the Higher Education Act 2004 requires that all universities in 
England must join this scheme, which is independent and free for students. The Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 drastically reduced the availability of 
legal aid, and even if legal representation is not employed, court fees must be paid and the 
procedure is drawn out and demanding.33 The cost-free nature of the OIA scheme (to 
students), coupled with its relative speed and informality, makes it an attractive route for 
remedy compared to the courts. 
But bringing a complaint to the OIA does not preclude litigation.34 Students with no income 
or low income, with less than £3000 savings, would get remission on County Court fees.35 If 
the OIA does not give the desired outcome, and the stakes are ever higher in the context of 
changes to contemporary Higher Education (seen, for instance, as an ‘investment’ of 3 x 
£9000 fees to be lost if the student does not graduate), then court proceedings look more 
appealing. In what follows, we consider the likelihood of the success of the four possible 
routes to legal redress outlined above. As the Equality Act route is by far the most likely, we 
consider that in detail in the remainder of the article. 
                                               
33 As Mummery LJ put it, in Maxwell [2011] EWCA 1236, para 7, ‘Litigation in the courts against Higher 
Education Institutions … is not, except in very special circumstances, a course that anyone fortunate enough to 
be accepted for a course of higher education should be encouraged to take up. Most people would agree it is not 
in the interests of students … to engage in a stressful and expensive activity like litigation …’.  
34 Indeed under s 118 (2) EqA, the time limit for bringing a claim to the County Court is extended from 6 to 9 
months if a complaint is referred to the OIA within 6 months of the act that is being the subject of the complaint. 
Time can also be extended to 8 weeks after the conclusion of Alternative Dispute Resolution proceedings (s 
140AA EqA 2010). 
35 Under The Civil Proceedings and Family Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order 2015 2015 No. 576 (L. 7). 
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The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) gives effects to the rights guaranteed by the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). It places an obligation upon public 
authorities to act compatibly with the Convention36 and an obligation of consistent 
interpretation upon courts.37 This obligation of consistent interpretation38 applies also to other 
human rights instruments guaranteeing the right to education of which the UK is a 
signatory.39 Universities are public authorities for the purposes of the HRA.40 Section 7 of the 
HRA permits the bringing of proceedings against a public authority for breach of the 
obligation to act compatibly with the Convention. The Convention includes a right to 
education.41 The right is “not to be denied” an education. That right must be secured without 
discrimination.42 Conceivably, a student who considers that insufficient accommodation for 
                                               
36 Section 6. 
37 Section 3. 
38 Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1967] 2 QB 116 (CA); Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] 3 WLR 
113 (HL); R v Gul [2013] UKSC 64; see M Waibel, ‘Principles of Treaty Interpretation: Developed for and 
applied by national courts’ in H Aust and G Nolte, eds, The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic 
Courts: Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence (OUP 2016). 
39 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26; International Covenant for Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Article 13; Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, Article 10; Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, Article 28-30 (though only for those few students under the age of 18); Convention on 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 24; European Social Charter, Article 17; EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, Article 14. The UK must also comply with the EU CFR when implementing EU law, see Case C-167/10 
Fransson ECLI:EU:C:2013:280. For discussion of the EU CFR’s right to education, see, eg, G Gori, ‘Article 
14’ in S Peers et al, eds, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart 2014); C Wallace and J 
Shaw, ‘Education, Multiculturalism and the Charter’, in T Hervey and J Kenner, eds, Economic and Social 
Rights Under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Hart 2003). 
40 R (Douglas) v North Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] All ER (D) 375. 
41 Article 2 of Protocol 1 in Pt II HRA. 
42 Article 14. 
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her disability had been made in the manner in which her degree is being assessed, may assert 
that her right to an education is being breached in a discriminatory manner. A successful 
claim of this nature could result in injunctive relief or damages or both.43 However, the cases 
so far pursued in the UK courts under Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR and Article 14 
ECHR have concerned only exclusion from education.44 Moreover, the judgments have 
adopted a restrictive view of the Convention right, regarding it as a weak right requiring 
evidence of a systemic failure of the national educational system denying access of an 
individual to a minimum level of education within it. It is difficult, therefore, in the light of 
the approach adopted by the UK courts, to imagine that a student is better equipped to pursue 
a successful claim under the Human Rights Act than she would be in seeking to rely upon the 
provisions of the Equality Act. 
A second basis for litigation may be the common law. It is now established that a student’s 
relationship with a university is contractual in nature, albeit with a public law element.45 It 
follows that breaches of express or implied terms of that contract on the part of the university 
may give rise to litigation and, indeed, such claims have been brought and have succeeded.46  
Furthermore, claims in tort, where a university’s actions in its role as a provider of education 
gives rise to reasonably foreseeable harm to a student, are also possible. They depend upon 
the now well established principle that a duty of care exists on the part of education 
                                               
43 Section 8 HRA. 
44 Simpson v United Kingdom [1989] 64 DR 188, Ali v Head Teacher and Governors of Lord Grey School 
[2006] UKHL 14, [2006] 2 AC 363 and A v Essex County Council [2010] UKSC 33, [2010] WLR (D) 184. 
45 Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] 3 All ER 752. 
46 For example, Buckingham et al v Ryecotewood College, Warwick Crown Court, 28 February 2003 
(unreported) cited in Harris, above n 8.   
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professionals to their students (and, presumably, vicarious liability on the part of their 
employers).47 
Both of these possibilities are discussed at length by Harris.48 In the context of the issues on 
which we focus in this article, however, neither seems the most likely way for a student to 
litigate where a university has failed to make an appropriate adjustment to a method of 
assessment. It is difficult to imagine an express contractual term binding the university to 
take steps beyond those guaranteed by the Equality Act. An implied term to that effect is 
even more unlikely.  As to a claim in negligence (for example), as Harris points out with 
some force, such claims suffer from the need to show that the education professional has 
failed to act ‘in a way in which reasonably competent teacher…would have acted’.49 The 
requirement of reasonable foreseeability is also a difficulty here. It would have to be shown 
that it was reasonably foreseeable that a particular method of assessment would cause the 
precise damage claimed to the student in question. That might be particularly difficult if the 
academic was unaware of the existence of the disability or the way in which it impacted on 
that student’s ability to carry out certain tasks. Again, it is difficult to see in what way our 
putative student with a disability would be better placed to pursue her claim by this route, 
especially because, as we will see, the Equality Act duties apply whether a disability is 
declared or not.  
                                               
47 Phelps v London Borough of Hillingdon [2000] 3 WLR 776, as recently applied in Siddiqui v Chancellor, 
Masters & Scholars of the University of Oxford [2018] EWHC 184 (QB). 
48 Harris, above n 8.   
49 Bolam v Friern Barnett Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1WLR as applied in Liennerd v Slough 
Borough Council [2002] All ER (D) 239. 
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Of the four causes of action above, the Equality Act 2010 is by far the most realistic source of 
justiciable legal rights for students with disabilities seeking adjustments to assessments. 
The Equality Act 2010 (EqA) outlaws discrimination against students with a disability50 by 
universities, and any other institutions within the higher and further education sector, in the 
‘arrangements it makes for deciding upon whom to confer a qualification’.51  Section 91(9) 
places upon those bodies a positive duty to make reasonable adjustments. To put it plainly, if 
a student with a disability is assessed in order to determine whether they are allowed to 
progress to a later part of their course of study or to decide whether they are awarded a degree 
and if so of what class, the relevant institution must make ‘adjustments’ to the assessment 
process – but, as we will explain below, only those ‘adjustments’ which are ‘reasonable’. 
Failure so to do would render the institution liable to an action in damages in the civil 
courts,52 and would expose the institution to the potential for reputational damage. 
What is ‘disability’? 
The Equality Act 2010 defines the protected characteristic of “disability”. There is no legal 
duty upon a university to make adjustments for students are not disabled within the meaning 
of the Act. Section 6 adopts a “medical model” to define disability. This model seeks to 
identify the extent to which a mental or physical “impairment” limits the student’s ability to 
carry out day to day activities. In other words, it is the effect of impairment upon function 
that creates the disability. The medical model stands in contrast to the “social model” of 
                                               
50 Defined in s 6 (see below). 
51 S 91(3)(a) and (10). 
52 S 114. There is also scope for an EqA claim to form part of a judicial review of a decision of a university. 
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disability adopted by a number of instruments but most notably the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (UNCRPD).53  
This article does not seek to critique the choice of a medical model by the framers of the 
Equality Act and its predecessor legislation, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.54 There 
is a great deal in the literature already on this topic.55 Nor is there any scope for an argument 
that EU law requires that the social model, particularly as enshrined in the UNCRPD56, 
                                               
53 UNCRPD (adopted 13 December 2006, entry into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3.  The UNCRPD is not 
itself directly enforceable in UK law, see R (on the application of SG and others (previously JS and others)) v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16, although note the dissenting opinions of Hale and 
Kerr (in the minority).  
54 On the history of the DDA, see B Doyle, ‘Enabling Legislation or Dissembling Law? The Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 64. 
55 An early use of the term ‘social model’ is found in P Hunt, Stigma: The Experience of Disability, (London, 
Geoffrey Chapman, 1966). For further discussion, see M Oliver, Understanding Disability: From Theory to 
Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 1996 and 2009); M A Stein, ‘Disability Human Rights’ (2007) 
95(1) California Law Review 75; I Solanke, ‘Stigma: A limiting principle allowing multiple-consciousness in 
anti-discrimination law’ in D Schiek and V Chege, (eds), European Union Non-Discrimination Law (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2009); A Lawson and D Schiek, eds, European Union Non-Discrimination Law and Intersectionality 
(Ashgate, 2011); M Oliver, ‘Defining Impairment and Disability: Issues at stake’ in E Emens and M Stein, (eds) 
Disability and Equality Law (Ashgate 2013); C Heißl and G Boot, ‘The application of the EU Framework for 
Disability Discrimination in 18 European countries’ (2013) 4 European Labour Law Journal 119; J L Roberts, 
‘Healthism and the Law of Employment Discrimination’ (2014) 99 Iowa Law Review 571, 584-587; L 
Waddington, ‘ “Not disabled enough”: How European Courts filter non-discrimination claims through a narrow 
view of disability’ (2015) European Journal of Human Rights 11; L Waddington, ‘Saying All the Right Things 
and Still Getting It Wrong: The Court of Justice’s Definiton of Disability and Non-Discrimination Law’ 22 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2015) 576-591; C O’Brien, Union citizenship and 
disability: restricted access to equality rights and the attitudinal model of disability’ in D Kochenov, ed, 
Citizenship and Federalism in Europe: The Role of Rights (CUP, 2016).  
56 Article 1 of the UNCRD defines disability thus: 
‘Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments which, in interaction with various barriers, may hinder their full and effective participation 
in society on an equal basis with others.’ 
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should displace, or at least supplement, the narrower definition in Section 6, for the purposes 
of litigation under the Equality Act. The EU’s adoption of the UNCRPD in 201057 meant that 
an obligation existed, from that point on, to interpret EU law consistently with the UNCRPD. 
Directive 2000/78/EC establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation (The Framework Directive).58 It includes disability as a protected 
characteristic and the EU’s approval of the UNCRPD meant that from that point onward the 
Directive had to be interpreted as applying to people who met a the UNCRPD’s social model 
definition of disability.59 Arguably, this might require UK courts, when interpreting the 
Equality Act (the UK legislation which implements the Directive) to disapply Section 6, in 
whole or in part, to the extent that it is incompatible with a broader social model definition.60 
The Framework Directive, however, is confined to employment. A proposed extension of 
protection to all other areas of EU competence (including education)61 has thus far not been 
adopted and there remains no EU law outlawing disability discrimination in education. 
Although the UK is itself a signatory to the UNCRPD,62 as already noted above, the 
                                               
57 Council Decision 2010/48/EC concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities OJ 2010 L 23/35. 
58 OJ 2000 L 303/16. 
59 See for example Cases C-335/11 and 337/11 HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Ring v Dansk Almennyttigt 
Boligselskab; HK Damark, acting on behalf of Werege v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro 
Display A/S ECLI:EU:C:2013:222. 
60 In fact we doubt even this is required. For a fuller exploration of this point, see T Hervey and P Rostant, ‘ “All 
About That Bass”? Is non-ideal-weight discrimination unlawful in the UK?’ 79 Modern Law Review (2016) 
248-282. 
61 COM(2008) 426 final, 2008/0140 (CNS). 
62 See n 53 above. 
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obligation of consistent interpretation that imposes does not extend to adopting 
interpretations which are contra legem.63 
Under Section 6 EqA, three elements – the existence of an impairment (which may be mental 
or physical), the requirement that that impairment be ‘long term’ and finally that, for that 
long term,64 it has had a substantial adverse effect on the student’s ability to carry out day to 
day activities – must be proved before the right to complain of discriminatory treatment is 
established. We examine each of the elements of the definition of disability in turn, focussing 
on the impairments caused by unseen disabilities. 
 
‘IMPAIRMENT’ 
Any tendency to equate ‘impairment’ with ‘illness’ was dealt with firmly by the Scottish 
Court of Session, Inner House in Miller v Inland Revenue Commissioners65 (a case brought 
under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA) but of continuing authority). The 
leading opinion of Lord Penrose, at paragraph 23, makes it clear that ‘physical impairment 
can be established without reference to causation and in particular, without any reference to 
any form of illness’. Thus, for example, there is no requirement that students with a SpLD 
need show that the difficulty is, or is caused by, an ‘illness’. 
                                               
63 See n 38 above. 
64 There are some exceptions to this broad rule. For examples, conditions which fluctuate or recur are also 
covered as a certain conditions such as cancer where disability is ‘deemed’ from the point of diagnosis and even 
after cure. 
65 [2006] IRLR 112. 
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In J v DLA Piper,66 the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) made the point that there may 
be difficult medical questions in deciding the nature of an impairment. Where there might be 
a dispute as to the existence of an impairment, it would be sensible to identify whether the 
claimant’s ability to carry out day-to-day activities was adversely affected and to draw 
‘commonsense’ inferences about the existence of impairment from the results of that enquiry. 
The courts’ pragmatic approach, which dispenses with the complications of causation and 
even precise identification, focuses on the question of function. Does some aspect of the 
claimant’s condition, physical or mental, impair their functioning? 
Guidance to the interpretation of the EqA is to be found in the EHRC Equality Act 2010 
Technical Guidance on Further and Higher Education (the Technical Guidance)67 and the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) Code of Practice on Employment 2011 
(the Code). Appendix 1 of the Code deals with the meaning of disability. Paragraph 6 of the 
Appendix makes it clear that mental impairment is a term which is intended to cover mental 
illness, SpLDs and ASCs. Further insight can be found in government’s own Guidance on 
Matters to be Taken Into Account In Determining Questions Relating to the Definition of 
Disability (the Guidance).68 Paragraph A5, setting out a non-exhaustive list of impairments 
which can give rise to a disability mentions developmental impairments ‘such as autistic 
spectrum disorders (ASD), dyslexia and dyspraxia; learning disabilities; mental health 
conditions with symptoms such as anxiety, low mood, panic attacks, phobias….; mental 
illness such as depression and schizophrenia’. There must however be an impairment. The 
                                               
66 [2010] ICR 1052. 
67 https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/equalityact2010-technicalguidance-feandhe-2015.pdf 
(last accessed 14 December 2017). 
68 Available https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-download/equality-act-2010-guidance-
matters-be-taken-account-determining-questions (last accessed 14 December 2017). 
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EAT in J v DLA Piper69 pointed out that low mood or anxiety caused by a reaction to adverse 
circumstances is not a mental impairment, as distinct from clinical depression. So a student 
who is suffering low mood or anxiety, for instance because of a bereavement, but is not 
suffering clinical depression, does not have a ‘disability’ under the EqA. 
 
‘SUBSTANTIAL ADVERSE EFFECT’ 
Mere possession of the impairment is not sufficient on its own to establish a disability. The 
EqA requires that an impairment must have a substantial adverse effect on a person’s ability 
to carry out day-to-day activities. Substantial merely means more than minor or trivial.70 The 
phrase ‘day-to-day activities’ is not defined. The DDA did define the phrase and limited it to 
a consideration of a closed list of ‘activities’ which included, for example, mobility, physical 
dexterity and the ability to lift and carry ‘everyday’ objects.71 The Guidance invites a 
consideration of time taken to carry out an activity,72 the way in which an activity is carried 
out as compared to how someone without the impairment might carry out the same activity73 
and the cumulative effects of an impairment74 or impairments.75 
                                               
69 [2010] ICR 1052. 
70 S 212(1) EqA. 
71 DDA Sch 1, Art 4. 
72 The Guidance, B2. 
73 The Guidance, B3. 
74 The Guidance, B4 and B5. 
75 The Guidance, B6. 
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The approach of the UK courts to the issue has been to focus the enquiry on things that a 
person cannot do or can only do with difficulty.76 It is a ‘functional deficit test’. This 
approach is supported by the Guidance which gives the following example: 
‘A person has mild learning disability. This means that his assimilation of information 
is slightly slower than that of somebody without the impairment. He also has a mild 
speech impairment that slightly affects his ability to form certain words. Neither 
impairment on its own has a substantial adverse effect but the effects of the 
impairment taken together have a substantial adverse effect on his ability to 
converse.’  
A university assessment per se is not a ‘day-to-day activity’. But aspects of an assessment 
may be. So, for instance, an ability to take a patient’s history, as part of an assessment on a 
medical degree, is close to (if not identical to) an ability to have an ordinary conversation in a 
professional context, in order to elicit information. That latter ability is a ‘day-to-day 
activity’.  A student whose ASD meant that she had difficulty understanding what people 
mean, unless they are very direct and explicit, and who finds it hard picking up on nuance 
during conversations might have an impairment which has a substantial adverse effect on 
day-to-day activities. 
 
‘LONG TERM’ 
The adverse effect must be long term, which means that it has either already lasted for 12 
months, is likely to last for a total of 12 months, or is likely to last for the rest of the person’s 
                                               
76 Goodwin v The Patent Office [1999] IRLR 2 (EAT), Aderemi v London & South Eastern Railway Ltd [2013] 
ICR 591. 
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life.77 The focus is not on how long the impairment has existed but for how long it has, or is 
likely to have, the relevant adverse effect. In cases involving developmental delay or SpLDs, 
this is unlikely to pose a problem. The disabling aspects of mental health conditions can more 
difficult to predict or retrospectively ‘fit’ into the description of ‘long term’ since they can 
fluctuate and may cease altogether for periods of time only to reappear. The EqA makes 
specific provision for this in Sch 1 Para 2(2) by providing that if a condition has previously 
had a substantial, adverse and long-term effect but has now ceased to do so, it is to be treated 
as continuing to have that effect if the effect is likely to recur. Likely means ‘could well 
happen’.78 Most episodes of mental ill-health could well recur, so the majority of students 
with mental health impairments under the EqA meet the ‘long term’ criterion. 
 
The duty to make adjustments 
Once a student meets the definition of disability, there is a duty upon the university to make 
reasonable adjustments to its assessments of that student, where the assessments put the 
disabled student at a disadvantage. The duty is contained in Section 20 EqA and for our 
purposes the relevant parts of the Section are Section 20(3) and (4): 
‘…where a provision, criterion, or practice of A’s [here the university] puts the 
disabled person at a substantial disadvantage79 in relation to a relevant matter in 
                                               
77 Sch 1 Art2 EqA. 
78 The Guidance, C3. 
79 ‘Substantial disadvantage’ means a disadvantage that is more than merely trivial, see EqA, s 212 (1). 
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comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to 
have to take to avoid the disadvantage.’ 
‘... where a physical feature puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage .... in 
comparison to persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to 
have to take to avoid the disadvantage.’ 
Sch 13 para 2(4) provides that relevant matters include the provision of education, deciding 
on whom a qualification is conferred, and the qualification conferred. 
However, and importantly, Sch 13 Para 4(2) provides that a provision, criterion, or practice 
does not (our emphasis) include the application of a competence standard. Para 4(3) describes 
a competence standard as ‘an academic…..standard applied for the purpose of determining 
whether or not a person has a particular level of competence or ability’. 
As far as we can tell, the meaning of these provisions is untested in the courts,80 but it seems 
to us that they can be summarised thus. Students with a disability are entitled to a reasonable 
adjustment to a method of assessment, or the physical circumstances in which that assessment 
is carried out, if the assessment is used to decide upon the conferring or classification of a 
degree, or on progressing to the next stage of study. This is so unless the method of 
assessment itself tests a particular competence, for example, the ability to work within certain 
                                               
80 Indeed, one of the few decisions of the OIA to reach the courts in judicial review proceedings, Maxwell 
[2011] EWCA 1236, concerns whether the OIA was reasonable to fail to make a “finding” on the question of 
whether disability discrimination had taken place.  It was held both at first instance (Case No CO/2778/2009, 
Foskett J) and at appeal that it is not irrational for the OIA to refuse to do so in resolving a student complaint. 
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time constraints.81 Students with disabilities are not entitled to have a lower standard of 
attainment expected of them as compared to non-disabled students.82 
The duty applies whether or not a university knows that a student has a disability.83 This 
aspect of the EqA means that higher education institutions are worse placed than employers, 
who benefit from a specific exception to the application of the duty in cases where they do 
not know, or could not be expected to know, of the existence of the disability.84 
Conceivably, a court might take the view that an adjustment cannot be a ‘reasonable’ 
adjustment unless the university knew that it was needed. But that does not appear to be the 
effect of Section 20 EqA, which instead situates the consideration of what is reasonable in the 
context of what a university can be expected to do to avoid the disadvantage caused by the 
‘provision, criterion, or practice’ or the ‘physical feature’. The Technical Guidance, without 
explaining why, implies that the duty appears to be divided into an ‘anticipatory duty’85 
(imposing an obligation to consideration and action in relation to ‘barriers that impede all 
disabled people’), and a further ‘responsive’ (our term) duty, once appraised of an individual 
                                               
81 See EHRC Equality Act 2010 Technical Guidance on Further and Higher Education (the Technical Guidance) 
para 7.35 https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/equalityact2010-technicalguidance-feandhe-
2015.pdf (last accessed 14 December 2017).  
82 Kendall, above n 1, reports examples of students challenging their mark, on the basis that the fact that the 
students had ‘learning support plans’ in place entitled them to higher marks in their assessments.  
83 See the Technical Guidance, para 7.21 https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/publication-
download/equality-act-2010-technical-guidance-further-and-higher-education (last accessed 14 December 
2017).  
84 EqA Sch 8, Para 20. 
85 See also Smith, above n 1. 
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disabled student’s needs.86 These two separate duties should have implications for 
universities’ policies and practices. 
The Section 20 duty exists towards all students with a disability, whether declared or not. 
Failure to take basic common-sense steps, like adopting a dyslexia-friendly font as standard 
in printed examinations or seeking to avoid last minute changes to arrangements (particularly 
difficult for people with an ASD), might well result in a successful complaint of a breach of 
Section 20, even by a student who, for instance, had not declared her/his dyslexia. 
Universities are obliged to behave appropriately, given that 8% of their students have an 
unseen disability. Universities can be expected to anticipate the common types of such 
disabilities and the common adjustments without which a student cannot be said to be 
experiencing university assessments without a disadvantage compared to other non-disabled 
students. Not to make the obvious adjustments would be unreasonable.  
However, without detailed knowledge of an individual student’s particular disability and 
resulting needs, it is not practically possible to ensure that all correct adjustments are made. 
Especially where a university has taken reasonable steps to ensure that students have the 
opportunity to disclose disability,87 but the student has not done so, a court might not 
conclude that a particular step in relation to that particular individual would be a reasonable 
                                               
86 The Technical Guidance, paras 7.19 to 7.25 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/equalityact2010-technicalguidance-feandhe-2015.pdf 
(last accessed 14 December 2017). 
87 See Disability Rights Commission, Finding Out About People’s Disabilities- A good practice guide for 
further and higher education institutions, published by the Department of Education and Skills, 
Dfes/0023/2002, http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/7937/1/Understanding%20the%20DDA.doc (last accessed 14 December 
2017). 
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adjustment. In other words, students should not assume they can rely on the Section 20 duty 
if they have not declared their disability. 
What is clear at any rate is that for the duty to bite there must be a provision, criterion, or 
practice, or a physical feature which places the student in issue at a disadvantage compared to 
other non-disabled students in relation to a relevant matter. In the context of an assessment, 
the provision, criterion, or practice might be a matter inherent to the assessment itself, for 
example the setting of a three hour time limit, or about the circumstances in which the 
assessment is carried out, for example, sitting the examination in a large room alongside 100 
other candidates. For a student whose SpLD means that she is slower at processing written 
text, the disadvantage as compared with students who do not have that impairment is that a 
time limit of three hours impacts upon her ability to complete the examination to a degree not 
experienced by students with processing speeds within the ‘normal’ range. For a student who 
has impaired concentration, consequent upon a depressive illness, sharing a hall with 100 
other candidates represents challenges not experienced by students whose powers to shut out 
extraneous stimuli are not similarly impaired. 
Once the disadvantage, which must be substantial, is established, the university is required to 
do what is reasonable to remove the disadvantage. 
 
WHAT NEEDS ADJUSTING? 
The first issue to be addressed is whether the ‘provision, criterion, or practice’ is really a 
competence standard.  
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Competence standards in university assessments are, in essence, what is being tested for. If 
an assessment process is aimed at testing the student’s knowledge and understanding of a 
particular topic, then the competence standard is how well she performs against an 
established mark scheme calibrated to reflect levels of knowledge and understanding from the 
inadequate (fail) to the exceptional (starred first). Assessment processes in universities also 
seek to assess students’ skills. Skills typically being assessed in universities include reasoning 
and analytical skills, categorisation and structuring of thought, written or verbal 
communication skills, and time management. Indeed, the distinction between ‘knowledge’ 
and ‘skill’ in this context is disputed.88  Any part of the assessment process which is a 
competence standard cannot by definition be a provision, criterion, or practice and need not 
be adjusted. 
The distinction between competence standard and provision, criterion, or practice therefore 
requires an intense focus on what is being tested. If a law lecturer designs a module on 
international commercial law and sets, as an assessment, a mock arbitration in which students 
must form syndicates and debate a problem against each other, a student with a mental illness 
who, for example, when under stress, experiences paranoia and anxiety and a need to 
withdraw, might well be placed at a significant disadvantage. If the method of assessment is 
merely a more interesting way of finding out how much the students have understood about 
the substance of international commercial law (‘knowledge’), there would be a requirement 
to consider an adjustment for that student. If, on the other hand, the assessment was also to 
assess the ability of future lawyers to work in teams, to express themselves well verbally, and 
                                               
88 There is (obviously) a significant body of literature on effective assessment in higher education contexts. For 
some examples, see S Bloxam and P Boyd, Assessment in Higher Education: A Practical Guide (Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press, 2007). 
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to think quickly (‘skills’), then the method of assessment is inextricably associated with a 
competence standard. There would no Section 20 EqA obligation.89 
To what extent universities may find themselves called upon to justify their decision to set 
certain competence standards, particularly where they place students with disabilities at a 
disadvantage, is a moot point. It is not difficult to imagine a claim before a court in which it 
is alleged that a university failed to make a reasonable adjustment to an assessment. If the 
defence were to be that no adjustment was required since the chosen method of assessment 
was, in the words of the Technical Guidance ‘inextricably linked to the standard itself’,90 
doubtless the university would consider it prudent to adduce evidence that that was indeed so. 
If there was little or no evidence that there had been a serious consideration of why that 
particular method of assessment had been chosen,91 or that that particular competence was 
one which was really one which required testing, the university might face difficulty. To 
choose a ridiculous example for illustrative purposes, it is difficult to imagine an university 
persuading a court that ability of a student to sing answers to a question in perfect tune was 
really a competence standard unless the examination was a practical for voice students in the 
Department of Music. On the other hand, however, an ability to organise complex thoughts or 
concepts quickly and communicate them effectively in written or verbal form; or even an 
                                               
89 The Equality Challenge Unit, a HEFCE funded charity has produced a  very useful guidance paper, 
“Understanding the interaction of competence standards and reasonable adjustments” (ECU July 2015) 
https://www.ecu.ac.uk/publications/understanding-the-interaction-of-competence-standards-and-reasonable-
adjustments/ (last accessed 14 December 2017). The authors recommend it as further reading on this issue. 
90 The Technical Guidance, para 7.36 https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/equalityact2010-
technicalguidance-feandhe-2015.pdf (last accessed 14 December 2017). 
91 For a detailed discussion of the implications of choices of different higher education assessment approaches, 
in the Irish context, see J Hanafin, M Shevlin, M Kenny and E McNeela, ‘Including Young People with 
Disabilities: Assessment Challenges in Higher Education’ (2007) 54 Higher Education, 435. 
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ability to operate under pressure, instrumentalised in a time limit for an examination, could 
all potentially constitute competence standards associated with degrees. The need to show 
that there is a link between the competence standard and the particular form of assessment 
chosen should encourage individual academic staff to consider carefully what they are testing 
(‘knowledge’, ‘skills’, a combination); how they are testing it; and why it is being tested in 
that way.  It should also encourage universities to consider, at programme level, what the 
‘competencies’ or ‘qualities of graduates’ of that particular university programme are, and 
how the form of assessments associated with particular degree programmes are necessary to 
demonstrate those competences or qualities. In our experience, neither practice happens 
uniformly across the board in higher education institutions. There are many good reasons for 
universities and their academic staff to think carefully about these questions: EqA compliance 
is just one of them, but an important one. 
Once competence standards are excluded, every other aspect of the assessment process is a 
potential provision, criterion, or practice: length and location of examinations; whether the 
examination paper is printed in 12 point font; whether the examination is written or oral; 
what are the consequences of a fail or a low mark for overall degree classification, or ability 
to resit; and so forth. At this point, the sole remaining consideration is what it is reasonable to 
expect the university to do. 
 
WHAT IS REASONABLE? 
As far as we can tell, there is no appellate jurisprudence on this question available from the 
civil courts. The reason for this, as noted above, is that, at present, once internal processes 
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have been exhausted, students wishing to complain about a failure by a university to make 
reasonable adjustments tend to use the Office of the Independent Adjudicator (OIA).  
Once all internal procedures have been exhausted, a student may submit a complaint to the 
OIA. If the OIA finds that a reasonable adjustment has been denied, it will find the complaint 
justified and will make a recommendation to the university. The recommendations are not 
however legally binding. Neither are they published.92 Quite what criteria are employed by 
the OIA in reaching its decisions thus remains opaque.  
It follows that our analysis here can only be by analogy. There is existing jurisprudence in 
this area. It derives exclusively from the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunals to hear 
complaints in relation to work, under Chapter 5 of the EqA. We assume for the purposes of 
our analysis that the same approach would be adopted by the civil courts should a claim 
against a higher education institution be brought before them. It is unlikely that the civil 
courts will want to reinvent the wheel, particularly as that would run the risk of creating 
contradictory or inconsistent approaches to concepts which the entire structure of the EqA 
demands be treated as common across the various areas of application of the Act. 
                                               
92 The OIA publishes some of its decisions in the form of summary ‘case studies’ on its website, see 
http://www.oiahe.org.uk/news-and-publications/recent-decisions-of-the-oia/case-studies.aspx (last accessed 14 
December 2017). From these, we can learn that the OIA has taken the view that universities are sometimes 
obliged to adjust degree classifications where they have failed to take into account a disability (see eg Case 
Studies 79, 78); but sometimes there is no obligation to adjust marks (see eg Case Study 60). A rule to the effect 
that a disability must be disclosed within three months of the date of the assessment may sometimes have to be 
adjusted for a student with unseen disabilities (see eg Case Study 31). Failure on the part of a university to 
consider retrospectively the effects of an unseen disability in the light of further information that emerged about 
the effectiveness of various adjustments was unreasonable (Case Study 14).  But any reasoning behind these 
decisions is not published and they lack the specificity of judicial proceedings. 
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The general approach to the question of reasonableness is that the test is an objective one for 
the court.93 
The predecessors to the EqA in the area of disability were the Disability Discrimination Act 
(DDA) 1995, the DDA (Amendment) Act in 2005 and the Special Educational Needs and 
Disability Act (SENDA) 2001. Helpfully, Section 18D(1) DDA set down a list of matters to 
be taken into account when considering the reasonableness or otherwise of an adjustment.  
Although they have not been repeated in the EqA, the framers of the legislation preferring not 
to limit the matters that a tribunal could take into account, they have almost all found their 
way into the EHRC Employment Code94 and into the Technical Guidance95 and remain a 
helpful guide. We will adopt the list, adapted for the purposes of this article, as a useful way 
of addressing the general topic of reasonableness. 
Essentially, there are two broad aspects to the reasonableness test: effectiveness and 
practicability. An adjustment that will not be effective in mitigating the disadvantage suffered 
by the student is not a reasonable adjustment. Equally, it is not reasonable to require a 
university to do everything a student requests, however impractical that is. 
 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Section 20 requires that the university do what is reasonable to ‘avoid the disadvantage’ 
caused to the disabled student by the particular aspect of the assessment that creates 
                                               
93 Smith v Churchill’s Stairlifts plc [2006] ICR 524. 
94 The Code, Para 6.28. 
95 The Technical Guidance, Para 7.61. 
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difficulties. It follows that a university is not required to make adjustments that are 
ineffective, although any particular adjustment need not be completely effective in removing 
the disadvantage in order to be considered reasonable.96  
In order to establish what adjustment or adjustments might be effective, the university must 
understand the way in which the impairment which underlies the disability interacts with the 
process of assessment to create the disadvantage in the case of the student with the disability. 
In employment, this is most often done by a process of workplace assessment. In the context 
of higher education, there is obviously a role to be played by any disability support teams, 
such as in specialist units operating as part of the general university student support 
structures. Universities cannot simply assume that one size fits all with a particular label 
when deciding on adjustments for assessments. Specialist units will need to understand the 
individual student and how their disability impacts on the ability to undertake specific 
assessments associated with their degree programme. Given the points we make above, 
concerning competence standards, it will also be necessary for specialist units to understand 
the assessments at issue, and what the relevant academic staff or programme are seeking to 
test in a particular assessment. All of this means effective and detailed/sufficiently specified 
communication97 between specialist units, students, and academic and professional services 
staff (eg charged with QA). 
                                               
96 Noor v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2001] ICR 695. 
97 The importance of communication between all parties when reasonable adjustments in this context are 
discussed has been stressed in the literature, see, eg, K Elcock, ‘Supporting students with disabilities: good 
progress, but must try harder’ (2014) 23 (13) British Journal of Nursing 758. 
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The danger of ‘one size fits all’ is perfectly illustrated by the case of Project Management 
Board v Latif.98  That case arose out of the jurisdiction for Employment Tribunals to hear 
complaints against qualification bodies.99 Ms Latif was registered blind. Her membership of 
the Project Management Institute (PMI) required her to take an examination set by the PMI. 
The PMI had had examination candidates who were registered blind in the past. They 
therefore agreed to allow Ms Latif double the time permitted to non-disabled candidates and 
the use of human ‘reader/recorder’ as they had with other such candidates. It did not, 
however, permit Ms Latif to use her own laptop or to use a computer supplied by the test 
centre onto which certain specialist software had been loaded. Ms Latif’s preferred method of 
taking the examination was to use a computer she operated herself and she was placed at a 
disadvantage by having to use a method of working which was alien to her. She brought a 
claim of breach of Section 20 and succeeded. The EAT, upholding the Tribunal, noted that 
the Tribunal had remarked upon the PMI’s treatment of blind people as ‘a generic class rather 
than focussing on Ms Latif’s individual needs’.100  
University policies or practices, such as automatic blanket application of extra time in an 
examination, or automatic extensions for assignments, or a signalling system for students’ 
work to be marked ‘sympathetically’ with regard to grammatical or spelling error, or that in 
any other way adopt a ‘one size fits all’ approach are unlikely to be reasonable adjustments in 
the case of every individual student.  As we noted above, however, universities are likely to 
want to adopt some blanket policies (such as use of certain fonts in examination papers).  But 
                                               
98 [2007] IRLR 579. 
99 Qualification bodies are defined in s 54 EqA and the definition excludes institutions in higher Education (s 
54(4)d). 
100 Para 27, p 582. 
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they will need to go further.  Effective adjustments take into account the requirements of each 
student. They consider how the impairment, interacting with the provision, criterion, or 
practice, or physical feature of the university, creates disadvantage, and how that provision, 
criterion, or practice, or physical feature, might be adjusted to remove or alleviate the 
disadvantage. 
Some students apply for Disabled Student Allowance (DSA). Those eligible for the benefit 
have a DSA Needs Assessment, carried out by an assessor independent of the higher 
education institution. Our focus here is on the relationship between the DSA Needs 
Assessment and the EqA duties. We do not consider here whether there are any other 
consequences for a higher education institution of not complying with a DSA Needs 
Assessment recommendation. In theory, a DSA Needs Assessment is supposed to make 
recommendations for the university aimed at meeting the individual needs of the student in 
question. In practice, however, the recommendations in DSA Needs Assessments are often 
minimal and generic. For example, it is common to see a recommendation that a student with 
a SpLD receive 25% extra time for an assessment. But if the ability to complete the task in 
the assessment within a set time is a competence standard, that is, it is (part of) what is being 
assessed, as we have explained, at least as far as liability under the EqA is concerned, a 
failure to comply with that recommendation will have no consequences for the university. 
Conversely, a university may believe that compliance with a DSA Needs Assessment 
recommendation is all that it is required to discharge its obligations under the EqA. That may 
not be the case. It may be that other adjustments are required.  
PRACTICABILITY 
The other element of the reasonableness standard is what is practicable for the university to 
do. Students may request any adjustment under the EqA: they are only entitled to those 
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adjustments which are reasonable. The point of the qualifying term ‘reasonable’ is to exempt 
universities from having to make every adjustment that might mitigate or obviate the 
disadvantage.  The assessment of reasonableness is a question of balancing a number of 
competing interests.  There can be no ‘one size fits all’ in this aspect of the reasonableness 
test either. But there are some practices which are more or and some which are less likely to 
be held by a court to meet the test.  We consider some of the main elements of the 
practicability side of the reasonableness test below. 
(i) The safety and health of other students or staff 
At one end of the spectrum, a situation where a requested adjustment puts at risk the health 
and safety of other students, university employees, or even the general public, suggests that 
the adjustment would not be reasonable. 
A breach of health and safety legislation can never be a reasonable adjustment.  Imagine a 
student with ADHD and associated impaired coordination and motor skills.  Following a risk 
assessment required under health and safety law, it has been agreed that he will undertake 
certain laboratory practicals only under supervision. The student subsequently asks for the 
supervision to be removed during assessment practicals, because the presence of the 
supervisor is making him anxious and affecting his ability to concentrate. He considers that 
his concentration difficulties are part of his ADHD and he thinks that it would be reasonable 
to make an adjustment by removing them for practicals which are part of his assessment. The 
university refuses, because of the perceived risk to the student and others in permitting him to 
do potentially dangerous practicals without supervision. If the university can show that its 
decision is necessary to secure compliance with relevant health and safety legislation, the 
requested adjustment would not be reasonable.  If, on the other hand, a more general health 
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and safety risk assessment is at issue, an adjustment might be reasonable if the increased risk 
to other students or staff is small and manageable. 
(ii) The cost of the adjustment, in the context of the available resource 
The next two elements of reasonableness interact with each other: cost against available 
resource.  The Technical Guidance makes the simple point that the simpler and cheaper an 
adjustment is to make, the more chance that it will be considered reasonable. But it is not just 
the cost in the abstract: what is relevant is the cost in the context of the resources available to 
the entity being asked to make the adjustment. The case of Cordell v Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office101 confirms that a tribunal is entitled to take into account a variety of 
considerations when assessing the cost factor. In Cordell’s case, these included the size of the 
budget set aside for reasonable adjustments, what the employer had spent in similar situations 
in the past, what other employers were prepared to spend, and policies set out in collective 
agreements. It also included the salary of the employee. To put it plainly, an adjustment for 
employees costing £50,000 would not be reasonable for a small bakery, but it might be for 
ICI or Virgin.  
Applying similar principles to the higher education sector, a court might consider the overall 
university budget or turnover, the budget for reasonable adjustments, the last annual spend on 
reasonable adjustments, the cost of adjustments made for students in similar circumstances in 
the past, what other similarly-resourced universities provide, and any surplus made by the 
university from the presence of that particular student.  A court might also consider the terms 
of the university’s policies on disabled students, and how the university holds itself out to 
future students with disabilities, in terms of what resources it offers in the way of support.  
                                               
101 [2006] ICR 280. 
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The implication is that larger, better-resourced universities are held to a different standard 
when it comes to what is reasonable than smaller, less-well-resourced universities.  This is 
something that students might wish to bear in mind when choosing their university.  
Relevant resources include both internally and externally available resources. In addition to 
financial resources, internal resources include available staff time (of both academic and 
professional services staff), staff competence (for instance, in terms of administrative 
expertise), and physical resources (such as rooms, equipment).  External resources include 
externally available funding, and also resources owned or controlled by the student.  So cost 
is unlikely to be a successful defence to a claim if the university has failed to consider to what 
extent other sources of funding may be available to take up some or all of the burden of a 
requested adjustment. Similarly, if the student is prepared, for instance, to use a specialist 
piece of equipment they already own to facilitate the adjustment, or there is an external 
source of such equipment,102 that ought to be considered. Equally, an unwillingness of a 
student to do so would also be factored into an assessment of reasonableness. 
An adjustment to an assessment may be impracticable for a range of reasons related to cost 
and available resources.  Adjustments which make significant demands on the university in 
terms of limited resources such as staff time, or other resources such as physical space, are 
less likely to be reasonable than those which do not. For example, large scale written 
examinations, with many candidates in the same room at the same time, are so arranged 
because of the cost and administrative and logistical difficulties of timetabling and 
invigilating the same examination taken in several smaller spaces at the same time. If 
                                               
102 For the 2017/18 academic year, full time eligible students under the Disabled Students’ Allowance scheme 
may receive a specialist equipment allowance of up to £5238 for the whole course, see 
https://www.gov.uk/disabled-students-allowances-dsas/what-youll-get (last accessed 14 December 2017). 
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candidates did not all sit the same examination at the same time, this would create the need 
for complex quarantining arrangements or the setting of multiple examinations in the same 
topic for each cohort in order to protect the integrity of the assessment. Such an arrangement 
would have inevitable consequences for administrative staff time in supervising the 
quarantine; or academic staff time in devising examinations and marking them. If a university 
found itself simply unable to accommodate a large number of students at any one time 
demanding total or relative isolation when sitting an examination, because of lack of 
availability of rooms either in the university itself or anywhere in the relevant location, the 
issue of practicability might well be deployed to defend a claim of failure to make an 
adjustment.  As pressures increase on academic staff being expected to teach larger cohorts, 
coupled with other managerial changes to UK higher education,103 what is reasonable to 
expect a member of academic staff to do to adjust an assessment will also change.  
Equally, if the disadvantage to the student could be mitigated in another way, less costly to 
the university, a more costly adjustment would not be reasonable. So, for instance, a policy to 
the effect that students must complete an examination within three hours in a large hall with 
all the other candidates might disadvantage a student with anxiety, who has a limited 
concentration span, especially in large groups of people.  The student might request that the 
exam is broken up into three one hour time periods, with 20 minute breaks in between, and to 
sit in a room with fewer people, or alone with an invigilator.  But if the student were to sit at 
the back of the room, so that s/he is not in the sight-line of others, or at the front, so they do 
not have others in their sightline, might that mitigate the disadvantage at lower cost to the 
                                               
103 See, on the effects of increased managerial pressures on academic staff on equality agendas for students with 
disabilities, Kendall, above n 1; Smith, above n 1; Hanafin et al, above n 91; T Tinklin, S Riddell, and A 
Wilson, ‘Policy and provision for disabled students in higher education in Scotland and England: The current 
state of play’ (2004) 29 Studies in Higher Education 637. 
43 
 
university, in terms of invigilation and room resources?  If so, the requested adjustment 
would not be reasonable. 
(iii) The time available to make the requested adjustment 
A third element of practicability to be considered in determining whether a requested 
adjustment to a university assessment is reasonable is the element of time.  It is relatively 
common for universities to encourage students to declare unseen disabilities before they sit 
an examination, to allow relevant adjustments to be put in place.  A student who discloses an 
unseen disability and asks for an adjustment the day before the examination would find it 
more difficult to persuade a court that the requested adjustment is reasonable than one who 
gives the university several months to put the requested adjustment in place.  However, 
refusal to adjust a temporal rule, for instance a rule to the effect that disabilities must be 
disclosed within a certain time-frame,104 could be unreasonable.  This would be the case, for 
instance, if a student with an unseen disability such as dyslexia, dyspraxia, a medical 
condition such as fibromyalgia, or mental ill-health, found it more difficult than a student 
without such a disability to make a timely disclosure. 
Universities often also have a policy to the effect that students have at most two (or 
sometimes three) attempts at each element of a university assessment. Often the second (and 
third) attempts are ‘capped’ as resits, with marks being recorded only as pass marks, rather 
than the actual grade achieved.  But that policy itself may breach Section 20 EqA.  The 
question of time plays differently here.  For instance, a student might delay undertaking a 
dyslexia test, fearing that the label implies laziness or lack of ability.  If that student fails an 
examination, or a set of examinations, they might overcome that fear, take a test, and 
                                               
104 It is common for universities to require, for instance, that disability or other mitigating circumstances be 
disclosed within two or three months of the date of an assessment. 
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discover that they are indeed dyslexic.  A university policy that required the notification of 
the dyslexia in advance of the first sit examinations, otherwise resit marks would be capped at 
the pass mark, whatever the achievement in an adjusted resit examination, is potentially a 
breach of Section 20 EqA.  The student could request an adjustment of that policy. In 
assessing the reasonableness of that adjustment, a court would note that there is no time (or 
other resource) involved in adjusting the policy in the case of the individual student, and 
allowing the ‘resit’ to count as a ‘first sit’.  It is merely a matter of recording the marks 
achieved, rather than the pass mark.  Such a policy would not be justified by reference to 
resources or time available to make the requested adjustment. 
(iv) Confidentiality 
Students are entitled to have the existence of any disability kept confidential.105 The EqA 
specifically provides that the university must have regard to the extent to which a proposed 
adjustment is consistent with the request for confidentiality.106 There may well have to be a 
discussion over the trade-off between making very public alterations to an assessment for a 
student and the way in way such an adjustment will compromise confidentiality.107 If the 
student insists on confidentiality and there is no practical way of making the adjustment 
without singling them out, the adjustment is less likely to be reasonable.  
                                               
105 Sch 13 Para 8 EqA. 
106 Sch 13 Para 8(2) EqA. 
107 For a discussion of the benefits of disclosure, see, Kendall, above n 1; W Cunnah, ‘Disabled students: 
Identity, inclusion and work-based placements’ (2015) 30 Disability & Society 213. Reasons a student may 
choose not to disclose include perceptions of stigma and not identifying as disabled, see, eg, Riddell and 
Weedon, above n 7; T Mortimore and W R Crozier, ‘Dyslexia and difficulties with study skills in higher 
education’ (2006) 31 Studies in Higher Education 235-251, either of which may be associated with class or 
nationality-based cultures.  
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(v) Disadvantage to other (non-disabled) students, or other students with different 
disabilities 
The Employment Tribunals have recognised that the effect of an adjustment for one 
employee upon other employees is obviously a relevant factor in assessing reasonableness.108 
Disadvantaging other students in an assessment, for example, by keeping an examination hall 
at an uncomfortably warm temperature for non-disabled students, would be an important 
consideration.   
In the context of unseen disabilities, we might imagine an assessment which calls for a group 
project.  A student with an ASD finds himself in a group with three other students, all from 
countries other than his own. Because of his ASD and their varying cultural approaches, he 
finds it almost impossible to get along with this group and, after working with that group for 
6 weeks, applies to be transferred as a reasonable adjustment. It is proposed that he is 
transferred to another group which has already worked out what it wants to do, how it will be 
done and who will do it, in the remaining 4 weeks before the group project is due to be 
handed in. The second group considers that the new student will disruptive and difficult, and 
will jeopardise the excellent mark that the second group can show (from formative 
assessment marks) it is headed for.  In these circumstances, the adjustment requested might 
not be reasonable, partly because of the time available, but partly because of disadvantage to 
other students. 
In our view, less likely to be a powerful consideration would be a perception of unfair 
advantage for the disabled student harboured by other students. The court might well ask 
what had been done to manage that perception and what difficulties it caused the university in 
                                               
108 See for example Jelic v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [2010] IRLR 744. 
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any case.  Educating non-disabled students about the effects of disabilities, and reasonable 
adjustments,109 and effectively managing any reputational fallout from student complaints or 
dissatisfaction would be within the capacity of the university, and it would not be 
unreasonable to expect a university to take such steps. 
(vi) Existence of a university policy of which students have notice 
We noted above that one factor in the cost/resources aspect of reasonableness is the 
university’s policies on disabled students, in particular the support offered by a university to 
disabled students.  In addition, a reasonableness assessment would take into account other 
university policies or practices of which the student has notice. 
One element of university practice that might be requested to be adjusted is what is 
colloquially known as a ‘fit to sit’ policy.  These policies differ in their detailed application, 
but the essence of each is that, if a student presents herself as ‘fit to sit’ the assessment, no 
subsequent adjustment will be made for disability (or ill-health, or other compassionate 
reason).  So, taking an example from outside the EqA context, a student who suffers a 
bereavement of a close family member, but chooses nonetheless to sit an examination shortly 
thereafter may not subsequently have the examination deemed ‘not-sat’ for the purposes of 
re-sitting in the event of a fail or a poor mark.  Universities might argue that ‘fit to sit’ 
policies embody competence standards.  By presenting as ready to sit the examination, the 
student warrants that she is able to undertake the stringencies of the assessment as it stands.  
                                               
109 Incidentally, such an activity would go some way to meeting the duty to ‘foster good relations between 
persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not …’, EqA 2010, s 149 (1) (c).  
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The existence of the policy, and the fact that students knew, or could be deemed to have 
known, of its existence, would be one element a court would take into account when 
assessing reasonableness. But it would not be decisive. 
A student with a diagnosis of clinical depression and anxiety, who experiences panic attacks, 
might decide to manage those without disclosing them to the university.  That student might 
present for an examination, but find she was unable to complete it, having suffered a panic 
attack during the examination. She might request as a reasonable adjustment to be permitted 
to sit the examination de novo, as if she had not yet sat it, without penalty. In such 
circumstances, she might be successful in arguing that the university’s unwillingness to 
disapply its ‘fit to sit’ policy is unreasonable. 
(vii) Existence of a ‘learning agreement’ or practice between the university and the 
individual student 
Finally, courts would also take into account any individual arrangements, agreements, or 
practices in place between the university and the relevant student.  For instance, a student 
with an ASD and associated social anxiety who is comforted by ‘stimming’110 (which could, 
for instance, constitute hand-flapping or producing guttural noises), might be concerned that 
the stimming would impede their ability to undertake a practical examination, for instance a 
medical student taking a patient’s history.  The university and the student might agree that the 
student would access support to develop strategies to manage her social anxiety.  If the 
student failed to access the support, but nonetheless requested an adjustment to the 
assessment (for instance, in the form of being allowed to retake a failed assessment as if for 
the first time), the court would take into account the reasonableness of that request, given that 
                                               
110 L Wing, The Autistic Spectrum (Oxford: Pergamon 1997). 
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the student had not kept her ‘side of the bargain’ in accessing the support provided to 
accommodate her disability. 
 
Overall, what is important is that the question of reasonableness is a multi-factoral 
consideration. A reasonable adjustment is an adjustment which addresses the specifics of an 
individual student in the context of the specifics of an assessment. Attempts at making 
adjustments to assessments are unlikely to be robust unless all of the following are addressed. 
First, adjustments must be based on a properly informed understanding of the student’s 
disability.  Second, there must be a clear consideration of the way in which the chosen 
method and/or physical circumstances of assessment (the ‘provision, criterion, or practice’, or 
‘physical feature’) may disadvantage the student as compared to non-disabled students. 
Third, a consideration of what adjustments would mitigate or relieve that disadvantage 
altogether is required. Finally, thought must be given to what factors might make it 
unreasonable to expect the university to make the adjustment or adjustments.111 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
What might Dr James, with whom we began our analysis, make of all the above? What might 
the senior management team in her university?  What would be helpful to them would be a 
clear answer to the question ‘what must I/my university do to secure EqA compliance for 
students with unseen disabilities?’  From Aidan’s point of view, the question is similar: ‘what 
are my legal entitlements under the EqA?’ 
                                               
111 Environment Agency v Rowan [2008] ICR 218. 
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We hope that it is plain from this analysis is that the best that can be done in terms of the 
answer to the questions that our imaginary characters would like to have answered is to say 
that the structure of the law suggests a process or series of processes that will make decisions 
more or less robust in terms of EqA compliance.  We cannot definitively advise that a 
particular approach will fulfil the requirements of the EqA.  There is no ‘quick fix’.112  All 
that can be done is to suggest the relative likelihood of different policies or processes being 
EqA compliant.  This is our first – and in some ways most important – conclusion.  Where 
students, academic staff, or members of university management bodies do not understand this 
aspect of the EqA and its obligation to make reasonable adjustments to assessments for 
students with unseen disabilities, the confusion (or muddle) which motivated our project 
ensues. 
Secondly, though, there are some points of relative clarity.  
Some things are so known and so common-sense and so straightforward to do that a failure 
on the part of a university to do them would almost certainly breach section 20.  We 
mentioned some of these ‘anticipatory duties’ above: the use of dyslexia-appropriate fonts in 
examination papers is a candidate example. 
General policies about the administration of assessment, articulated clearly and in a timely 
manner to all students, may well be defensible in the event of a request for an adjustment to 
such policies, so long as there are procedures in place to depart from those general policies 
where individual circumstances dictate.  In other words, compliance with anticipatory duties 
does not exculpate universities from responsive duties. 
                                               
112 Smith, above n 1, reported that ‘Teaching staff preferred a ‘quick fix’ to solve current problems rather than 
more general or background information that might feed into their practice.’ 
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Some things are not required under the EqA – although there may be a belief by some that 
they are – particularly adjustments to competence standards. 
Thirdly, a university reduces the risk of litigation (and reputational damage) if it follows 
certain approaches indicated by the EqA. Even if litigation is rare, we can expect its ‘shadow’ 
to shape behaviour.113 A key approach is to have policies, procedures, and resources through 
which individual assessment of individual students, in the light of specific assessments, in 
consultation with academic and other relevant staff, take place.  Within a complex 
organisation like a university, there will be a variety of actors contributing information and 
their interpretations of that information to the questions of whether there is a impairment, 
with a substantial long-term adverse effect on the ability to carry out day to day activities, 
whether an assessment in its unadjusted form places the student at a disadvantage, if so 
whether what is requested to be adjusted is actually a competence standard, and if not, what 
adjustments would have the effect of reducing or removing the disadvantage, and finally what 
is reasonable in the circumstances.  Universities therefore run a risk of being non-compliant 
with the EqA, unless there is some way of synthesising the various elements feeding into a 
decision to produce an institutionally-owned outcome for each student.  One way of reaching 
such a synthesis is to ensure meaningful dialogue between the constituent units within a 
university, each of which has knowledge and understanding of the various aspects that need 
to feed into the decision for an individual student.114   
                                               
113 The phenomenon of ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ is well-known in (socio)legal studies: see R 
Mnookin and L Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: the case of divorce’ 88(5) Yale Law Journal 
(1979), 950-997. 
114 In its January 2017 guidance paper (footnote 23) the Disabled Students Sector Leadership Group 
recommends the adoption of a strategic approach to the duty to make reasonable adjustments. In general terms, 
the guidance emphasises the importance of inclusive teaching practices (in order to meet the anticipatory duty) 
and recommends a corporate policy which ensures that all the relevant considerations contribute to a decision to 
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Assessments that are specifically tailored to assess the relevant competence standards are 
more likely to be EqA compliant. Of course, every form of assessment carries some element 
of practical limitation, be that temporal or material, and so it is not possible to assess solely 
on the basis of competence standards. But whether the competencies being assessed are skills 
or knowledge or a blend of both, it is both sound pedagogical practice and good for equality 
when academic staff think clearly and explicitly about how and why they are assessing the 
way they are assessing, and communicate that to their students. The EqA does not go so far 
as to require this kind of good practice within its ‘anticipatory’ duties, but universities who 
ensure that their staff adopt these practices are more likely to be compliant with the EqA. 
There is a challenge here for academic staff who remain within a mind-set of ‘standard 
practice’ university assessments (3 hour unseen examination, 4000 word assessed essay) 
without giving much thought to why they are doing so.  
Universities will want to have clear and evidenced consideration of what aspects of 
assessment constitute competence standards, and why they are so.  That is likely to be within 
the expertise of the academic department setting the assessment, though might rest with a 
central unit charged with oversight of assessments in the context of programme specifications 
and QA.  Disability units are likely to be able to interpret and advise on any medical 
evidence, and provide information on how the impairment interacts with the form, place, or 
time of the assessment, creating disadvantage. They might thus be well-placed to make 
suggestions about what adjustments might help. In the final analysis, unless an individual or a 
body within a university is charged with taking all of these things into account, for each 
student, and then making a final decision as to whether the duty to make reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                  
make (or not to make) an adjustment. One specific suggestion is that of a named, senior, individual with 
responsibility for ensuring compliance with the duty to make adjustments (para 35). 
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adjustments applies, and if so how it ought to be complied with, it is hard to see how the 
rigour that the EqA demands can be present.  
Fourthly, from the point of view of students, those students who have an understanding of 
their legal rights are likely to find it easier to navigate their higher education experience.  As 
reasonableness in requested adjustments includes consideration of the resources available to a 
university, prospective students with unseen disabilities may want to consider carefully which 
university is best for them: on the whole, larger, older, universities are better-resourced than 
smaller, more recently established universities.  On the other hand, post-92 universities may 
have progressed further with inclusive learning and teaching, and have more standardised, 
agreed practice across the university, because of the managerial models that pertain in that 
context. Students are advised to make timely notification of any disabilities, and to have 
explicit discussions about requested adjustments, explaining why the adjustment is effective 
in mitigating the disadvantage as well as practicable, and – if necessary – explaining or 
exploring why what is being requested to be adjusted is not a competence standard.  Such 
discussions can include concerns about confidentiality, bearing in mind the confidentiality 
obligations of the university under the EqA, and noting this may be a difficult call for many 
students.  Students who keep to their ‘side of the bargain’ in terms of accessing available 
support, or making available resources which they own or control, are more likely to be 
successful in showing reasonableness of a requested adjustment. 
The obligations which we outline in this article, although focused on assessment, of course 
also apply in other contexts. Some of the same disciplines that our analysis suggests make 
EqA compliance more likely in the context of assessment apply also whenever a university is 
requested to make an adjustment for a student with a disability. Universities should focus 
closely on what a student’s disability is, and in what way it is disabling, because of the 
53 
 
application of a ‘provision, criterion or practice’ of the University, or a ‘physical feature’, in 
order to determine what will be reasonable in the circumstances. 
The DDA obligations to make reasonable adjustments were first introduced in 1995. Before 
that, any adjustments that were made were voluntary: there was no underpinning legal 
obligation. Over those last 13 years, the Higher Education sector in the UK has changed quite 
significantly. Some of those changes have made it easier for students with unseen disabilities 
to access higher education, as we saw when considering the data on the proportion of 
disabled students (although some of the change may also be accounted for in greater public 
awareness and acceptance of unseen disabilities over the relevant period). In the context of 
massification of Higher Education, it is probably easier for universities to secure the policies 
and practices suggested by the ‘anticipatory’ obligation under the EqA than the ‘responsive’ 
obligation. Size and scale increase pressure to have policies and processes that apply 
institution-wide: where those are attentive to the needs of disabled students, the EqA can be 
said to have done its job. 
But scaling up of any institution makes it more difficult for it to deal with individuals. 
Particularly where academic staff:student ratios worsen, and/or where student-facing 
administrative staffing is cut, or reorganised/centralised, or both, in the name of ‘efficiency’, 
the individual-focused ‘responsive’ duties of the EqA become more difficult to achieve.  
Along with massification has come marketization and competition, which also change the 
nature of relationships between students and universities, and make universities more 
attentive to reputational damage. There is also – at least among some parts of the student 
population, and the UK population more generally – an increasing acceptability of disability 
rights narratives. This can lead to the desires and claims of an individual disabled student 
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becoming articulated as human rights entitlements, with all the cachet that comes with ‘rights 
talk’.115  
These interlocking phenomena may lead to a tendency towards a ‘line of least resistance’ 
when universities respond to those students who request adjustments on the basis of a 
claimed disability: a university which gives a student what she wants is unlikely to be sued, 
criticised on social media, or marked down in a NSS questionnaire. Our inclination, however, 
is to caution against such ‘gold-plating’ of the EqA duties. The legislative settlement is a 
balance between various different competing interests, including of future employers of 
students, and indeed society more generally. In the long run, if carried to its extreme, a ‘line 
of least resistance’ approach could have the effect of devaluing degrees, and the associated 
reputational damage to the sector. We wonder also whether it might also have a detrimental 
effect on people with disabilities who are genuinely put at a substantial disadvantage by a 
particular form of assessment. If it becomes an open secret that a student need only claim the 
need for an adjustment in order to access special treatment in assessment contexts, it becomes 
more difficult to single out those who actually need special treatment, and to focus resource 
on making sure that that treatment is tailored to adjusting for the disability at issue.  However 
appealing a claim to individual human rights may sound to our autonomy-focused Western 
21st century ears, human rights claims are not unproblematic when it comes to questions of 
allocation of resource. Not least, this is because human rights allow those individuals who are 
sufficiently powerful and articulate to claim them to effectively bypass democratically 
                                               
115 “Rights talk buys ten minutes of their attention. I use it like a magic wand.” J Osborn, Human Rights 
Program Harvard Law School and Francois Xavier Bagnoud Centre for Health and Human Rights Workshop, 
Economic and Social Rights and the Right to Health September 1993, appears to be unpublished and no longer 
available on the internet, cited in T Hervey, ‘The “Right to Health” in EU Law’ in T Hervey and J Kenner, 
Economic and Social Rights Under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart, 2003). 
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legitimated processes, such as the adoption of legislation.116 In the final analysis, we would 
therefore suggest that universities seek to comply with Equality Act requirements but also 
seek to make sure that they are not going further than is necessary to do so. 
 
Appendix: Summary of the practical considerations flowing from the implications of 
our analysis. 
Practical Considerations for a Higher Education Institution 
 What are our policies and procedures for determining whether a student is disabled, 
and are they transparent? 
Disability is defined in law, according to objective criteria. There must be a long term 
(mental or physical) impairment, which has a substantial adverse effect on the student’s 
ability to carry out day to day activities. The description of the legal position on the definition 
of disability set out above is, perforce, a brief summary of the law. In fact, the case law on the 
definition of disability is extensive and the statutory provisions even more complex than we 
have space to deal with here.  
                                               
116 D Beetham, ‘What Future for Economic and Social Rights?’ in R McCorquodale, Human Rights (Taylor & 
Francis, 2017); K Young, ‘The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: a concept in search of content’ 
33 Yale Law Journal (2008) 113; J L Cavallaro and E Schaffer, ‘Less As More: Rethinking Supranational 
Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas’ 56 Hastings Law Journal (2004-05) 217; A Eide C 
Krause and A Rosas, eds, Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (The Hague: Kluwer, 2001); M Craven ‘A 
View from Elsewhere: Social Rights, International Covenant and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ in C 
Costello, ed, Fundamental Social Rights (Dublin: Irish Centre for European Law 2001); H Steiner and P Alston 
International Human Rights Law in Context (OUP 2000); D Beetham, ‘What Future for Economic and Social 
Rights?’ 43 Political Studies (1995) 41. 
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What is clear, however, is that merely claiming to have a disability does not attract to a 
student protection under the EqA or impose upon a university an obligation to make 
adjustments. A university need not accept a student’s assertion that s/he is disabled under the 
EqA. Ultimately, it is for the university to form its own view, based upon whatever evidence 
it regards as useful and practicable to obtain. Universities may, for instance, decide to require 
medical certification of ‘impairment’. In light of the anticipatory duty the EqA places upon 
them, universities may adopt policies or procedures which err on the side of caution in the 
face of equivocal or limited evidence. That approach may avoid complaints or litigation. But 
it also carries some risks: in particular it does little to support the robustness of assessment 
methods or perceptions of unfairness among other students, academic staff or future 
employers of students. A more robust approach to what constitutes disability may pay 
dividends in that it is easier to attract ‘buy-in’ for adjustments for those students who meet 
the EqA definition. 
 What are our policies and procedures for determining whether the requested 
adjustment is reasonable? 
Under the EqA, universities need only make reasonable adjustments to a ‘provision, criterion, 
or practice’, or ‘physical feature’ which ‘puts the disabled person at a substantial 
disadvantage’ in relation to assessment ‘in comparison with persons who are not disabled’.  Is 
what is being requested actually an adjustment to a ‘competence standard’?  Universities may 
find that policies or practices that fail to distinguish carefully between the two are less 
effective in terms of staff (and student) support than those which do not. 
That said, universities will want to be sure that they have clearly articulated statements of 
what knowledge and skills are being assessed in a particular assessment, and why they are 
being assessed in a particular way.  At institutional level, these usually find expression in 
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programme regulations or other statements of compliance with QA benchmarks.  Regular 
consideration of the extent to which such statements address the question of what 
‘competencies’ are being tested, how, and why, could be an important procedural aspect of 
assessing reasonableness of requested adjustments. 
Universities will also want to be sure that their procedures take into account the various 
elements that feed into a reasonableness decision: in terms of both effectiveness and 
practicability of a requested assessment.  Universities must also have a process whereby, 
ultimately, a decision weighing all the relevant factors is made.  Decisions that explicitly state 
the elements taken into account, and articulate the reasons for a decision that a requested 
adjustment is – or is not – reasonable will provide more protection against possible litigation 
than those which do not.  By explaining clearly to a student why a particular decision is being 
made, particularly if that decision is made in dialogue with the student, they may also avoid 
future conflict between the university and the student, even if the student does not get 
everything they request. 
 Are our general policies adequate to meet obligations under general anticipatory 
duties under the EqA? 
Given that 8% of their students have an unseen disability, universities should consider what 
general policies will meet their ‘anticipatory duties’ under the EqA. Universities can be 
expected to anticipate the common types of such disabilities and the common adjustments 
without which a student cannot be said to be experiencing university assessments without a 
substantial disadvantage compared to other non-disabled students. Not to make the obvious 
adjustments would be unreasonable. An obvious example is the use of dyslexia-friendly 
fonts. 
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Practical considerations for an individual member of academic staff 
 What is my assessment testing, how, and why? 
The key practical consideration for individual members of academic staff is to be clear about 
what knowledge and skills their assessment is testing, how those skills are being tested, and 
why this is the case. This is, of course, nothing more than good pedagogical practice, and 
therefore ought not to be viewed as onerous. Determining what constitutes a ‘competence 
standard’ is a matter for academic staff who set and mark the assessment.  Once this is clear, 
and if it has been effectively communicated to all students, a discussion with a student, and a 
disability support unit (or member of professional service staff located elsewhere in a 
university) administering a procedure by which it is determined whether a requested 
adjustment is reasonable should be relatively straightforward. 
Practical considerations for a student 
 Am I disabled? 
Disability is defined in law, according to objective criteria. A declaration of disability is 
insufficient to bring someone within the protection of the EqA: there must be a long term 
(mental or physical) impairment, which has a substantial adverse effect on the student’s 
ability to carry out day to day activities. The university will not necessarily accept a student’s 
assertion that she is disabled. Students may need to show how they fall within the EqA 
definition. 
 Does the university know of my disability? 
While universities formally have a duty to make reasonable adjustments for students with 
disabilities whether the disability is declared or not, a student who does not declare a 
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disability is likely to find it more difficult to show that a requested adjustment is ‘reasonable’ 
than a student who declares it. 
Difficult questions of privacy arise. Individual students will reach their own conclusions on 
the balance between the university maintaining confidentiality and making adjustments to 
assessments. 
 What am I asking to be adjusted? 
A request to adjust a competence standard cannot be successfully made under the Equality 
Act. Such a claim would have to be brought under the Human Rights Act, contract, or tort, 
with all the difficulties outlined above. A request which clearly distinguishes between 
elements of the assessment which are a ‘competence standard’ and those which are not; 
which explains why the requested adjustment will be effective in mitigating their specific 
disadvantage; and which is practicable, taking into account health and safety, cost, resources, 
time-relevant elements, any disadvantage to other students, is more likely to be successful 
than a request which does not. 
